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My topic is, well, conceptual analysis and its limits. I will start by 
sketching what I mean by ‘conceptual analysis’, and saying a bit 
about how it is used in contemporary philosophy. Then I will point 
out two limitations of the method, and illustrate these limits with 
examples: some from the philosophical literature, and some from 
biology.  
1. Conceptual Analysis  
Conceptual analysis is the use of thought experiments and 
reflection on possible cases to reveal to ourselves the boundaries 
of our concepts: what it is for something to count as an F. The idea 
is to try to bring the contours of an ordinary concept into sharper 
focus. We learn from our reactions to cases; we learn something 
about what we think could count as a thing of a certain kind (c.f. 
Jackson 1998, 31-32). 
Here’s a banal example. Suppose you are offering an account 
of what it is for something to be a sandwich. You say: a sandwich 
is a food made from meat and/or cheese and/or vegetables en-
closed in bread. But then I problematize your analysis by asking, 
“is a hot dog a sandwich?” My own gut reaction is no, it’s not a 
sandwich. If you agree, we need to go back and refine our first pass 
account. Maybe a sandwich is actually sliced meat and/or cheese 
and/or vegetables enclosed in bread. But what about egg salad and 
tuna salad? Our theory needs further refinement! At this point, 
however, I propose abandoning the inquiry; obviously philoso-
phers don’t actually spend a lot of time developing careful theories 
of The Sandwich.  
Now, that example might make you think that conceptual 
analysis is nothing but messing around with words. That’s not 
1 This was written as a “public lecture… intended for a general 
audience” at the Center for Philosophic Exchange at SUNY 
Brockport. Please read it in that spirit. Thanks to the Brockport 
audience for discussion. 
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exactly wrong: we’re trying to figure out what exactly the word 
‘sandwich’ means, what our concept of a sandwich is. And as I have 
already suggested, nobody much cares about that question. But 
there are more interesting cases. I shall quickly sketch a couple of 
familiar examples, both to further illustrate how conceptual an-
alysis works, and to extract some thoughts about what conceptual 
analysis is used for.  
First, knowledge. For a long time people thought that know-
ledge was justified true belief. That is, they thought that if you 
believe p on the basis of good reasons, and p is true, then you count 
as knowing p. But then Edmund Gettier came along (1963) with a 
kind of counterexample now known as a “Gettier case”. Imagine 
that you’re taking a walk on a friend’s sheep farm. You see a sheep-
shaped rock by a tree, and form the belief that there’s a sheep by 
the tree. This is justified: after all, it looks like a sheep, and you do 
know that there are sheep around. And let’s further suppose that 
it’s true that there is a sheep by the tree: there’s one just behind the 
rock that you’ve mistaken for a sheep. Do you know there’s a sheep 
by the tree? It has seemed to many that no, you do not. You do not 
know that, even though you do have a justified true belief to that 
effect. So much for the analysis of knowledge as justified true 
belief. 
Second, free will. Lots of people care very much about whether 
we ever act freely. But whether or not we do might well depend on 
what free action is. What does it take for an action to be free, or to 
be freely chosen? Here’s one possibility: it requires that you could 
have chosen differently. You chose to read this paper, but you 
could have picked a different article, or chosen not to read a 
philosophy paper today at all. So your action is free because you 
could have acted differently. Now, if that’s what it means to act 
freely, then it’s tempting to think that your acting freely requires 
the falsity of determinism. (I only say that it is tempting. There are 
ways to try to claim that determinism is compatible with the ability 
to do otherwise; e.g. Lewis 1981). The idea of determinism is 
familiar: it says that events at time t are fully settled by the laws of 
nature and earlier events. There is only one possible outcome. So 
if acting freely requires the availability of genuine alternatives, then 
if determinism is true, we never act freely (or so the thought goes). 
But of course many people—compatibilists—think that free action 
is compatible with determinism, as long as you are careful about 
what it takes for an action to count as free. For example, Walter 
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freely just in case their action is caused by their own internal psych-
ological states—what they believe and want. Actions aren’t free 
when they are externally compelled. On his view, there’s a big dif-
ference between lying on the floor because you want to, and doing 
so because someone pushed you down. On this account of what 
free action is, it doesn’t matter whether or not determinism is true.  
Obviously I just opened a very large can of worms. So let me 
be clear that I’m not trying to do more than gesture towards the 
vast literature on free will. My only point is that whether or not we 
ever act freely depends, among other things, on what it would mean 
to act freely. What if any actions count as free? The ones such that 
we could have done otherwise? Or the ones that are caused by the 
agent’s desires and choices? Or something else? And these are 
questions about a concept: what is our concept of free action? 
Now, something that’s interesting about these two cases is that 
they actually illustrate two different uses of conceptual analysis. 
One use is to counterexample some particular analysis of what it is 
to be an F; this is what is at issue in the Gettier example. There, a 
particular account of what counts as knowledge—justified true 
belief—is challenged by the fact that we don’t think you actually 
know there’s a sheep by the tree. Our reaction to that kind of case 
reveals that that the justified true belief analysis doesn’t capture our 
concept of knowledge. 
The other use is to help figure out whether or not there are any 
Fs. This is what is at issue in the free will case. To settle whether 
the truth of determinism would or would not mean that we never 
act freely, we have to sort out what a free action would be. Let me 
further illustrate this with a simple example. Consider the question, 
“are there witches?” To make progress on this question, we need 
to know what we are asking. What is a witch supposed to be? What 
would count as a witch? If witches are women who can really make 
magic potions, cast real spells, fly on broomsticks, then there aren’t 
any. But if witches can be women with nontraditional religious 
beliefs who like to spend time in the woods, and maybe know a lot 
about herbs and herbal medicine, then there are some.  
Both uses have at their core the thought that we need to define 
the subject matter of an inquiry before we start. We need to know 
what we have in mind, what an F would be, in order to mean-
ingfully pursue questions about Fs. Is this analysis of Fhood a good 
one? Are there any Fs? Here’s Frank Jackson, noted defender 
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Although metaphysics is about what the world is 
like, the questions we ask when we do metaphysics 
are framed in a language, and thus we need to 
attend to what the users of the language mean by 
the words they employ to ask their questions. When 
bounty hunters go searching, they are searching for 
a person and not a handbill. But they will not get 
very far if they fail to attend to the representational 
properties of the handbill on the wanted person. 
These properties give them their target, or, if you 
like, define the subject of their search. Likewise, 
metaphysicians will not get very far with questions 
like: Are there Ks? Are Ks nothing over and above 
Js? and, Is the K way the world is fully determined 
by the J way the world is? in the absence of some 
conception of what counts as a K, and what counts 
as a J (Jackson 1998, 30-31). 
This idea, generalized, leads to what has become known as the 
Canberra Plan.  
The Canberra Plan is named after the town where the 
Australian National University is located, and it’s named after that 
town as a kind of surrogate way of naming it after two people: 
Frank Jackson and David Lewis. Jackson spent much of his career 
at the ANU; Lewis went to Australia every summer, and was both 
influenced by and influential in the Australian philosophical 
community. The Canberra Plan is basically a form of two-stage 
inquiry: 
Stage 1: do some conceptual analysis on whatever 
issue is in question: free will, personhood, pain. 
 
Stage 2: look around the world to see what best fits 
the description yields at stage 1.  
If nothing fits the description, then the thing you were investigating 
doesn’t exist. Of course, there are complexities here involving cases 
in which more than one thing fits the description, or something 
only partly fits the description (Lewis 1972). But they won’t really 
play a role in what’s to come.  
Stage 1 of the Canberra Plan is the conceptual analysis stage. 
The idea, again, is that conceptual analysis is important ground-
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has basically been the point of this section—of the knowledge and 
free will examples, and my discussion of the uses of conceptual 
analysis.  
2. The Limits of Conceptual Analysis 
So far, so good. But conceptual analysis has its limits, and in the 
rest of this paper, I want to call attention to and illustrate two of 
them. But before even telling you what they are, I want to flag that 
I am far from the only person to raise concerns about conceptual 
analysis. For example, Laura Schroeter (2004) argues that our grasp 
of the content of our own concepts is fallible. And Sarah-Jane 
Leslie and Mark Johnston (2012) argue that paying attention both 
to the way psychologists think about concepts and to the nature of 
generic generalizations changes how conceptual analysis looks. I’m 
not going to engage with this other work here; instead I will just 
raise two issues that are independent of their concerns. Let me be 
clear: I’m not in fact a foe of conceptual analysis, and I am not 
trying to rid philosophy of it. I think conceptual analysis is an 
excellent tool as long as one remains explicitly aware of its limits 
and pitfalls. My task here is to call attention to exactly that. 
Here are the two limitations to which I want to call attention. 
First, conceptual analysis by itself doesn’t tell you what concepts 
we ought to be deploying. Second, conceptual analysis by itself 
doesn’t tell you whether anything in the world answers to the 
concept. This second limitation amounts to saying that the second 
stage of the Canberra Plan must not get left by the wayside. Let me 
spell these out in turn, by means of some cases that I hope are 
independently interesting.  
3. Limitation 1: Conceptual analysis by itself doesn’t tell 
you what concepts we ought to be deploying.  
Conceptual analysis is by its nature descriptive. It is a tool for figuring 
out the contours of our existing concept of a person, or free action, 
or whatever. It can say nothing about whether our existing con-
cepts are good ones. That is, it offers no guidance at all on when 
we ought to revise our concepts; it offers nothing prescriptive.2 And 
2 Compare Strawson’s distinction in the second sentence of 
Individuals: “descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the 
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this matters, because there indeed are circumstances under which 
we ought to revise—or at least ought to consider revising—our 
concepts.  
One such circumstance is when a concept turns out to be 
empty. I’ll briefly come back to this at the end of the paper. 
Another such circumstance, the one I want to pursue now, is when 
we have ‘folk’ notions of stuff that scientists also tell us about—
for example, we have folk notions of what it takes to be a planet, 
to be solid, to have a spatial location.  
One case that I find interesting is that of an individual organism. 
Now, obviously most of us do not use the phrase ‘individual or-
ganism’ in casual conversation, but we do indeed have a basic, 
untutored, ‘pre-theoretic’ or ‘folk’ notion of this. We know how to 
individuate and count cats and dogs; we know the difference 
between one bush and three bushes; we know how many daffodils 
we planted by the driveway. This ability to individuate and count 
shows that we have the concept, whether or not we could ever 
articulate or define it. 
But of course ‘individual organism’ is also a scientific concept, 
used by biologists. And their use doesn’t always match the folk use. There 
are cases in which there are scientific reasons to count as one what 
the folk would count as many; there are cases where there are 
scientific reasons to count as many what the folk would count as 
one. (Or, perhaps better, there are scientific reasons to not use the 
folk notion of an individual organism, but to use multiple replace-
ment notions, depending upon the theoretical context.) But let me 
quickly sketch a couple of examples. 
The first example is of something that the folk treat as a single 
organism, but which biologists treat as many: the Portugese man-
of-war. It is not a true jellyfish, but a siphonophore, and it is 
considered to be a colonial animal. It consists of four polyps work-
ing in concert; it is more like a (small) beehive than a single animal. 
The details of why biologists consider it to be a colonial animal do 
not matter. What matters is that the decision to consider it not an 
‘it’ but a ‘they’ belongs to biologists, not the folk.3 
actual structure of our thought about the world, [sic] revisionary 
metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure” (1959, 9). 
3 For a little more information, see http://www.siphonophores. 
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The second kind of case involves things the folk treat as many, 
but there is at least some scientific reason to count as one: 
evolutionary or genetic individuals. Many plants, and some animals, 
expand asexually. Some, like strawberries, send out runners, as 
strawberries do; some, like dandelions, generate asexually produced 
seed-like things. Now, note that I did not say that many plants 
reproduce asexually. I said that many plants expand asexually. That 
was intended to be neutral between treating it as reproduction and 
treating it as growth. That’s because there is a genuine question about 
what we should consider to be an individual organism: should we 
consider the folk plants individual organisms, or should we take 
them to be mere parts of a much larger individual, which is marked 
off genetically? To make the question concrete: how many 
dandelions are in my yard? Many, as my neighbors surely think? Or 
just one? 
In a wonderful short paper called “What are Dandelions and 
Aphids?” (1977) the biologist Daniel H. Janzen argues for the latter 
answer. He calls such an organism an ‘evolutionary individual’. On 
the Janzen line, asexual expansion is growth; it is to get bigger, not 
to have babies. There is just one perennial dandelion in my yard, 
spatially scattered and many, many years old. It cannot be destroyed 
by a squirt of Roundup®. Quite generally, evolutionary individuals 
have different spatial boundaries and persistence conditions than 
the folk organisms that are their parts. As Janzen says of the EI 
aphid, “it is part of its growth pattern to spread itself very thinly 
over the surface of plants in the habitat, so thinly that a potential 
predator is unlikely to find much of it at once. Once much growth 
of the EI aphid has occurred, it is essentially indestructible as long 
as there is some food in the habitat” (1977, 588). 
Why say this? Primarily because thinking of organisms this way 
enables importantly different insights into evaluations of fitness, 
success, competition, and so forth. Again, the details do not matter, 
and whether Janzen is right doesn’t really matter either. What does 
matter are the following two points. First, there is a real question 
here: which is the better way to think of such organisms? Second, 
that question is one for biologists, not for philosophers, and not 
for the ‘folk’.  
The lesson from these cases should be clear. The Canberra Plan 
tells us to look around the world to see what, if anything, answers 
to our concepts. But we also need to look around in the world to 
see what concepts are useful in understanding it. We could sit 
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an organism. But what would be the point? What the right notion 
of an individual organism is—or, more likely, what the right 
notions are—depends upon the theoretical and explanatory 
concerns of the biologist. In short: conceptual analysis itself 
doesn’t provide any guidance about what concepts we ought to be 
deploying. It says nothing about when—or how—we should revise 
or outright eliminate certain ways of thinking about the world. This 
is a significant limitation.  
4. Limitation 2: Conceptual analysis by itself doesn’t 
tell you whether anything in the world answers to the 
concept. 
The second limitation, again, is that conceptual analysis alone 
doesn’t tell you whether or not the concept is empty. This ought 
not be in any way surprising. After all, the whole point of the 
Canberra plan is to explicitly add a ‘look around the world’ step. 
Concepual analysis alone obviously only tells us about our 
concepts, not whether anything answers to them. Nonetheless, it’s 
worth explicitly emphasizing it, because philosophy’s reliance on 
conceptual analysis is so entrenched that sometimes we almost 
forget that we’re doing it. To illustrate this point, let’s look at the 
literature on personal identity.  
The question of personal identity is the question of what makes 
for the continued existence of a person over time. What kinds of 
changes can a person survive? In virtue of what am I the same 
person as that cranky toddler 40ish years ago?  
There are of course a variety of views on this issue; here are 
simple versions of two prominent ones.  
Bodily continuity: x at time t1 is the same person as 
y at time t2 just in case x and y have the same body.  
 
Psychological continuity: x at time t1 is the same 
person as y at time t2 just in case x and y are 
psychologically continuous in the right sorts of 
ways.  
According to the bodily continuity view, a person is an organism, 
a living body. So for a person to continue to exist through time and 
change is for that living body to continue to exist. According to the 
psychological continuity view, what’s more important is the inside 
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and projects, and so forth. Now, it’s clear that satisfactorily fleshing 
out either view would require spelling out the relevant kinds of 
continuity in more detail. What exactly does it take for a body to 
persist over time? Bodies can survive some degree of physical 
change—we survive haircuts, surgeries, even amputations—but 
not just any physical change. Similarly, what exactly does 
‘psychological continuity’ amount to? Since Locke, memory has 
been taken to be central; since Reid, it’s been known that care is 
required with such a claim. So there is more work to be done to 
formulate a properly nuanced version of either account, but what 
is on the table is enough for my purposes.  
Each of these views faces various objections, but in each case 
there is one that stands out. The standard objection to the bodily 
continuity view—one that is used to motivate the psychological 
continuity view—is the intuition that a person could survive getting 
a new body. There are a host of examples from fiction: Kafka’s 
Metamorphosis, Freaky Friday, the Star Trek transporter.4 In such 
cases, we don’t recoil as though the book or movie has asked us to 
imagine a round square, but rather simply enjoy the show. The 
thought is that this demonstrates that what matters to a person’s 
continued existence is not particular physical underpinnings, but 
rather the kinds of psychological things mentioned above.  
But, of course, what such thought experiments really show is 
that we think of ourselves as things that could in principle be 
transported into a new body. They are pieces of conceptual an-
alysis, and as such only show something about our concept of a 
person. They don’t show that the world in fact contains anything 
like that. 
Let me press further with this point by considering a further 
move made by Richard Swinburne (1984). He conjoins the body-
swapping thought experiments—the standard objection to bodily 
continuity views—with the standard objection to psychological 
continuity views.5 This is that such views apparently allow for the 
4 The thought is that the transporter does not move people’s bodies 
from the ship to the planet’s surface, but rather ‘scans’ them and 
recreates a new, qualitatively indiscernible, body from materials al-
ready on the planet’s surface. 
5 Again, these are standard objections; good places to read further 
about such matters include Perry 1978 and Shoemaker and 
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possibility of duplication. If, as the above line of thought suggests, 
the features central to the continued existence of a particular 
person can be ‘moved’ to a new body, then surely that could 
happen more than once. Consider the Star Trek transporter again. 
The conceit is that it records all of the data of the traveler, like 
uploading a CD and then burning a new copy. But of course once 
you have uploaded the CD, you can burn as many copies as you 
like. Similarly, if the transporter can create a version of Kirk on the 
planet’s surface, it can create more than one. (And, unsurprisingly, 
both the original series and The Next Generation exploited this for 
plot purposes.6) But this kind of duplication looks quite 
problematic, for familiar reasons that I will relegate to a footnote.7  
Now, there are various responses available to both standard 
objections available. But we need not lose ourselves in the lit-
erature; all that matters for my purposes is that Swinburne takes 
them both to be successful, and concludes that persons can get new 
bodies but can’t be duplicated. On this basis, he endorses a soul 
theory of personal identity: we are immaterial, indivisible entities 
whose persistence over time cannot be further analyzed.  
Swinburne 1984. A classic discussion of duplication, and an inter-
esting solution, is Parfit 1971. 
6 In the original series episode “The Enemy Within,” Kirk is 
duplicated but neither is exactly ‘right’ and the two are somehow 
‘reintegrated’. In The Next Generation episode “Second Chances,” 
Riker is duplicated and the copy found many years later. Source: 
the interwebs. 
7 Call the person who has yet to enter the machine ‘Kirk1’, and call 
the two people who result ‘Kirk2’ and ‘Kirk3’. There are only three 
options: either Kirk1 is identical to both Kirk2 and Kirk3; or Kirk1 is 
identical to one of Kirk2 and Kirk3, but not both; or Kirk1 is identical 
to neither. But on the face of it, none of these options is 
satisfactory. To say that Kirk1 is identical to neither is to say that 
Kirk1 dies upon entering the machine, but the defender of 
psychological continuity thinks that it is a legitimate method of 
transportation in non-duplication cases. To say that Kirk1 survives 
as one but not the other would be arbitrary. And to say that Kirk1 
survives as both appears to lead to a violation of the transitivity of 
identity. If Kirk1=Kirk2 and Kirk1= Kirk3, then it must be that 
Kirk2=Kirk3…. but of course Kirk2≠Kirk3. They are in different 
spatial locations and could have a conversation with each other! 
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And finally we get to the point. Swinburne is drawing a con-
clusion about the world based on arguments that, at their core, are 
pieces of conceptual analysis. They involve looking at our reactions 
to admittedly fantastical cases to draw conclusions about our 
concept of a person. Our concept of a person, not what persons 
really are. To make this concrete: I actually find Swinburne’s view 
rather plausible as a piece of conceptual analysis. He may well be right 
that we think of ourselves as immaterial, indivisible entities. But I 
do not think that that is what we really are. Again, we need to recall 
both steps of the Canberra plan; conceptual analysis alone is not 
sufficient to tell us anything at all about what exists. Conceptual 
analysis is a useful tool for limning the boundaries of our concepts, 
not for telling us what answers to them. That is the second 
limitation. 
And, as it happens, the first limitation of conceptual analysis 
rears its head again in this particular case. To see how, suppose for 
the sake of discussion both that Swinburne is right about our con-
cept of a person, and wrong about the existence of immaterial 
souls. What follows? Well, by the letter of the Canberra plan, it 
follows that the concept is empty. There are no people. 
But that is a bit extreme. It would seem, at least, that I am a 
person and so are you. So presumably the right conclusion would 
instead be that we ought to revise our concept of a person: we 
ought to think about what we ought to think a person is. That is, if 
matters are as I am supposing, the question for those investigating 
personal identity becomes: what would be a useful concept, close 
enough to our pre-theoretic one to count as a concept of a person 
rather than, say, a toaster, but not empty, and not so beholden to 
folk intuition? And, as we have learned, that is just not a question 
that conceptual analysis itself can answer. That was the first 
limitation: conceptual analysis is not a tool for choosing among 
available concepts. It says nothing about either when to revise or 
how to revise.  
5. Conclusion 
Conceptual analysis is a handy philosophical tool. It helps define 
the questions we are asking, and keep our philosophical theories 
connected to ordinary usage. But it needs to be used with care and 
attention, and it must not be taken to constitute a complete philo-
sophical methodology. Conceptual analysis cannot tell us anything 
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Canberra plan can, it cannot tell us anything about when or how to 
revise our existing concepts (first limitation). 
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